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Texas has failed to meet the challenge of the hapless juvenile. Rather
than removing a segment of the discretionary power granted by the
legislature to the juvenile judge, the court in E.S.G. allowed a completely
ambiguous provision of the Texas Juvenile Act to stand. The majority
failed to establish any guidelines to help the parents, the juveniles, or the
law enforcement agencies to determine what acts are prohibited. It will
be left to the courts to determine which acts will call for a finding of
delinquency. Because of this decision, the juveniles of Texas must remain
dangerously close to the precipice of disaster in virtually every mode of
conduct.
Ronald E. Grant
Can Federal Tax Benefits Constitutionally Be Extended to
Private Segregated Schools? The Implications of
Green v. Kennedy
White residents of Mississippi established racially-segregated, private
schools to avoid the effects of court orders requiring prompt desegregation
in the public schools. Plaintiffs, Negro federal taxpayers and their minor
children attending public schools in Mississippi, brought a class action to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from granting tax-exempt status to
racially-segregated, private schools and from granting tax deductions for
contributions to such schools. Plaintiffs contended that sections 501 and
170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are unconstitutional to the ex-
tent that they represent substantial support by the federal government
to the segregated private school pattern.2 Held, preliminary injunction
granted:' Pending resolution of the constitutional issues, the Internal Rev-
enue Service may not approve further tax exemptions for private, all-white
Mississippi grade and high schools or tax deductions for contributions to
such schools, unless the IRS first determines affirmatively that the school
The purpose of the juvenile court is supposedly to correct a juvenile as a child rather than
to punish him as an adult. Consequently, juvenile records should not be subject to investigation
by various employers. By permitting this type of activity, the juvenile is given a permanent record
that is similar in nature to an adult criminal record. This is what juvenile laws were intended
to prevent. It was intended that the state should handle its wards as a parent would its own child,
and surely parents would not adhere to such policies in correcting their own children. See J.
MACK, supra note 23, at 311.
'See note 19 infra, and accompanying text.
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(c), provides federal tax deductions for contributions to
"charitable" organizations. Charitable organizations are those which are non-political, non-profit
(to individual members of the organization), and "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."
Id. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3), basically provides federal tax exemptions for those
charitable organizations in § 170(c).
a Note that this case grants only a preliminary injunction, and does not resolve the constitu-
tional issues. This Note, however, will deal primarily with the constitutional issues, rather than
jurisdictional issues or considerations calling for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
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is not operated to avoid desegregated public schools. Green v. Kennedy,
309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
School Desegregation Laws. The United States Supreme Court in 1954
handed down its historic decision on racial desegregation in Brown v. Board
of Education.4 For the first time, the Court held that "separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."' The Brown Court ruled that public
school segregation is unconstitutional, declaring it a deprivation of equal
protection of the law, which is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.6
By so ruling, the Court held unconstitutional all provisions of state or
local law requiring or permitting such discrimination. In BoIling v. Sharp,7
a companion case concerning District of Columbia public schools and
decided the same day as Brown, the Court came to a similar conclusion
as to federal law, based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The court declared that "segregation in public education .. . imposes on
Negro children . . . a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause."' The Court stated
that the federal government cannot be under any less duty under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment than that imposed upon the states
under the fourteenth amendment.!
In the second Brown decision, the pace of school desegregation was
established as "all deliberate speed."'0 In 1964, this pace was increased to
immediate compliance. In Grifin v. County School Board" and subsequent
cases, 12 the Court held that the state and its school districts were under a
present, continuing, and affirmative duty to establish unitary, non-racial
systems of public schools, and that continued operation of segregated
schools under a standard of "all deliberate speed" for desegregation was
no longer constitutionally permissible.
4347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Id. at 495. Thus, the Court expressly overruled the longstanding doctrine of "separate but
equal." See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6In 1955, in the second Brown case the Court formulated a decree to effectuate the 1954
decision. Realizing the impossibility of supervising the transition itself, the Supreme Court re-
manded each case to the appropriate federal or state court, with instructions to write the necessary
orders for the implementation of the desegregation in public schools. Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7347 U.S. 497 (1954).
SId. at 500.
' The fourteenth amendment applies only to the states. Because this case dealt with schools
in the District of Columbia, the Court was forced to rely on the fifth, rather than the fourteenth,
amendment, and was thus without an equal protection clause upon which to structure a principle
of equal educational opportunity.
'0 In the second Brown case, tbe Court held that school boards must make a "prompt and
reasonable start" to do away with dual systems. Because of the complexities arising from the
transition to integrated schools, the court provided for "all deliberate speed" in the implementa-
tion of the principles of the 1954 Brown decision. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. at 299-301
(1955).
't 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
sa The Court reaffirmed its position in 1968, and again in 1969, emphasizing the obligation of
every school district to end dual school systems immediately and operate only unitary schools
now and hereafter. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v.
County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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State Action, Equal Protection, and Education. State action in the form
of laws expressly providing for racial segregation in public schools was
held unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education."a To avoid the
transition to racially non-segregated schools, many state and local gov-
ernments turned to other forms of state action. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, remained firm. In 1958, the Court enlarged the concept of state
action by explaining that the 1954 Brown holding was "that the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids states to use their governmental powers to bar
children on racial grounds from attending schools where there is state par-
ticipation through any arrangement, management, funds, or property."14
In 1962, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision which held
unconstitutional the changing of public schools to "private" schools." A
Louisiana statute authorized public schools under desegregation orders to
become "private" schools operated in the same manner, in the same build-
ings, with the same money, and under the same supervision as the public
schools. The district court held that the scheme required such extensive
state control, financial aid, and active participation that the statute was
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."0
In Griffin v. State Board of Education ' a Virginia district court held
that grants of tuition by the state to private schools tended "in a determi-
native degree to perpetuate segregation," thereby violating the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Coffey v. State Educational
Finance Commission8 a federal district court applied Griffin to state tu-
ition grants to Mississippi children attending private schools. In 1965,
many schools in Mississippi were under court orders to desegregate." The
district court found that private schools established subsequent to the
desegregation orders were segregated and received substantial support
from the state tuition grants. The court concluded that these schools
constituted "a system of private schools operated on a racially segregated
basis as an alternative available to white students seeking to avoid de-
3 See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
14Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision without opinion. St. Helena Parish
School Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962), aff'g 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961).
16St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961). In a later case
involving private hospitals, the Fourth Circuit court of appeals concluded that massive grants of
federal funds to the defendant hospitals and the fact that those hospitals operated as integral
parts of joint federal and state programs constituted the necessary state action. Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
17239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965). In 1967, the Supreme Court banned legislation which
allowed private racial discrimination in selling privately-owned residences. The Court held that
this ban included all legislative enactments which will "significantly encourage and involve the
State in private discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967).
18 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
"o In the summer of 1964, the Evers desegregation ruling took effect. The order entered by the
district court on remand required filing of desegregation plans by Mississippi schools during the
summer of 1964. Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 328 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1964).
Also, in December 1964, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare adopted regulations
pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964), requiring public
schools systems to initiate desegregation plans for the coming year in order to remain eligible for
federal financial assistance, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1970).
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segregated public schools."" ° The court thus ruled the tuition grants by
the state unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment.
II. GREEN V. KENNEDY
In Green v. Kennedy the basic constitutional issue was whether grant-
ing federal tax benefits to private, segregated schools constitutes govern-
mental action violative of the fifth amendment. The IRS contended that
tax benefits may be denied a private, segregated school only if the opera-
tion of the school is unconstitutional by virtue of present state involve-
ment. In 1967, the IRS announced its policy concerning private schools:
where the school is segregated and its involvement with the state is such as
to make it unconstitutional because of state action, tax exemptions would
be denied. However, private schools not involved with discriminatory
state action would be allowed federal tax benefits."'
The court approached the problem by relying heavily on Coffey v. State
Educational Finance Commission." Not only the decision in Coffey, but
the entire evidentiary record of that case was utilized by the court in Green
v. Kennedy. As in Coffey, the court found that segregated private schools
were "established in Mississippi for the purpose of avoiding the result of
a unitary, non-racial public school system required by the Federal Court
decisions outlawing segregation in public schools, and in an attempt to
maintain a broad pattern of racial segregation in the school system.""
The court found further that tax benefits mean substantial support by
the federal government to the schools, and the segregated private school
pattern of which they are a part. The most significant support was not
found to be the exemption of the schools from taxes laid on their income,
but rather the deductions from income tax available to the individual
and corporate contributors of the schools. According to the court, capital
financing of schools based on contributions makes those contributions ex-
tremely important. The idea of "approval" by the federal government in
granting tax-exempt status is instrumental in soliciting contributions, as
well as the more obvious tax deductions available to those who contribute
to the tax-exempt organizations. 4
After concluding that the federal tax benefits mean substantial sup-
port to the private schools by the federal government, the court con-
sidered the legal significance of that support. Noting that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment does not permit the federal government to
aid private racial discrimination in a way prohibited to the states by the
fourteenth amendment, the court reasoned that the validity of the ap-
plication of the tax statutes is "to be determined on the basis of (1) their
practical tendency to increase the incidence of private discrimination,
"Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
"IRS Press Release (Aug. 2, 1967), CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 6734.
'2296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
3 309 F. Supp. at 1134.
24 Letters to potential contributors emphasized that "donations to the school are deductible
from your gross income for tax purposes." Id. at 113 5.
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and (2) whether the discrimination so augmented frustrates the exercise
of fundamental liberties." 5
The court then considered the impact of the tax benefits in determining
whether they can be constitutionally applied. The line of reasoning fol-
lowed is similar to Coffey. The true test, according to the court, is not
"good faith" or the lack of a discriminatory motive on the part of the
government, but rather the practical effect of the action in question. If
the state or federal government elects to place its power, property, or
money behind a private discrimination to the extent that it represents
substantial support, and tends in a determinative degree to perpetuate
segregation, then such support is unconstitutional."
Addressing itself to the particular contentions of the IRS and the facts
in Green, the court held that "the scope of constitutional protection can-
not be so narrowly defined to disregard the impact of past State action and
support, and to ignore the significance of current Federal support from tax
benefits." ' Holding constitutionally inadequate the assumption of the
IRS that only in the event of current state involvement or state action
could federal tax benefits be withheld, the court reasoned that where there
is a showing, as in this case, that the state has in the past aided substantial-
ly the establishment and maintenance of a dual system of segregated
schools, the constitutional guarantees apply. The court climaxed its opinion
by stating that "[t]he Federal Government is not constitutionally free to
frustrate the only constitutionally permissible state policy, of a unitary
school system, by providing government support for endeavors to continue
under private auspices the kind of racially segregated dual school system
that the state formerly supported.""0
III. CONCLUSION
Although the court did not finally resolve the constitutional question,
it did give an opinion which may foreshadow future constitutional de-
velopments. To reach its conclusion concerning the unconstitutionality of
federal tax benefits to private, segregated schools, the court noted that an
outright grant of funds by the federal government, which has the impact of
substantially aiding racial discrimination, is violative of the fifth amend-
ment. Reasoning that the impact of a federal tax exemption or deduction
is that of an indirect or "matching" grant, the court similarly declared that
the extension of such tax benefits to private, segregated schools would be a
violation of the fifth amendment. The court, however, also considered
the impact of federal acquiesence in past state action. Recognizing the
importance of the facts in this case, the court did not ignore the history
of state-supported racial segregation in Mississippi schools. The federal
2
sId. at 1136.
2'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); see note 30 in fra,
and accompanying text. See also Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); note 7 supra, and accom-
panying text.




government cannot, declared the court, support by tax benefits a dual
system of segregated schools which the state formerly supported.
Relying on a narrow interpretation of Green, it would seem that only
in the event of past or present state involvement could federal tax bene-
fits be denied to private all-white schools. However, under a broad in-
terpretation, Green could govern a situation which did not involve past
action by the state in support of segregated schools by considering the tax
benefits themselves as action violative of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. The fifth amendment imposes the same duty upon the
federal government as that imposed upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment." The broad test of state responsibility under the fourteenth
amendment encompasses state action of every kind which denies equal
protection of the laws. The Supreme Court has held that private conduct
abridging individual rights does violence to the equal protection clause
if "to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has
been found to have become involved in it.""0 It is a logical extension of
this constitutional interpretation that state action is involved whenever
public funds are directly or indirectly (as through tax exemptions and
deductions) made available to segregated schools."
If this conclusion is correct, any private school maintained for the pur-
pose of racial segregation would not qualify for federal tax benefits under
sections 170 and 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The practical
effect of this would be to make much more difficult the establishment and
maintenance of a system of private schools operated as an alternative to
desegregated public schools. The move toward school desegregation has
been slow; perhaps no other civil rights activity has created so much re-
sistance. The decision in Brown v. Board of Education was handed down
over sixteen years ago, and yet the institution of dual school systems con-
tinues to survive. A final determination that federal tax benefits may not
constitutionally be extended to private, segregated schools would be a
stride in the direction of achieving the implementation of the constitu-
tional guarantees delineated in Brown."
Darrel A. Rice
2"See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
a0Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
z There is a lower federal court case which presents a well-reasoned decision to this effect,
although there are later cases with opposite holdings. See Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945) (concerning a library rather than a school).
a The public concern and controversy over federal tax benefits for private, segregated schools
his' spotlighted the probable impact of such a determination. Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Chairman
of the Select Committee on Equal Education Opportunity, accused the Internal Revenue Com-
missioner of perpetuating southern "segregation academies" by granting them federal tax benefits
which are vital to their existence. The Senator objected to the IRS policy of accepting an
assurance from officials of private schools that their schools were open to all races. Commissioner
Ranol Thrower of the IRS responded by stating that since the federal court order requiring a
determination that schools receiving exemptions do not discriminate, the IRS has granted only
eight exemptions out of 136 applications. He also said field investigations will be made on com-
plaints about the schools, but that exemptions will not be withdrawn on the basis of past dis-
crimination. Dallas Morning News, Aug. 13, 1970, at 8A, cols. 4, 5,
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